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CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY REGIMES 
AND CREDIT DEFAULT IN THE US AND EUROPE 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 318/JULY 2009 
MARIA GERHARDT 
1. Introduction 
The latest US statistics on consumer bankruptcy filings
1 show that their numbers are soaring. 
Filings surpassed 1 million in 2008, which represents an increase of 31% compared to 2007. 
This number is expected to reach 1.4 million or more in 2009.
2 Higher insolvency and default 
rates lie at the heart of the subprime crisis and thus ultimately the global credit crisis.  
In the US, the rising trend of non-repayment has spread from housing loans to other types of 
credit, with credit cards being affected to a greater extent than other consumer credit segments. 
Within the past three years, US banks have reported significant increases of quarterly charge-off 
rates for residential real estate loans from 0.09% (1
st quarter 2006) to 1.80% (1
st quarter 2009) 
and for credit cards from 3.10% (1
st quarter 2006) to 7.49% (1
st quarter 2009).
3 At the same 
time, the numbers of consumer bankruptcies in the US have increased steadily.  
In Europe, charge-offs at banks increased as well, but have remained at much lower levels. For 
consumer credit, the ECB reports an increase in write-offs in the euro area from €2.7 billion 
(2003) to €4.5 billion (2008), which represents 0.6% and 0.7% of all outstanding loans in the 
respective years.
4 This compares to US charge-off rates in the same years of 3.1% and 4.2%, 
which is $19 billion (2003, €15.1 billion) and $34 billion (2008, €24.4 billion) in absolute 
terms. Even though the US market for consumer credit is more than twice as big as the euro area 
market, the losses due to non-performing consumer loans are enormous, and are likely to be 
affected by consumers’ increasing insolvency discharges as well.  
In the past, little attention was given to the various consumer insolvency regimes that exist in 
different countries to resolve financial difficulties. When comparing the US with a number of 
European countries, we note huge differences in legislation. In the US, the approach is rather 
supportive of consumers; there are less stringent and less tedious bankruptcy procedures, and 
under certain circumstances individuals can be free of debt within a few months. On this side of 
the Atlantic, insolvency regulations tend to give priority to creditors’ rights, allowing for the 
recuperation of a greater share of claims, often through stricter rules and longer periods of good 
conduct for consumers. Ireland is an example of a country with legislation that foresees a 
waiting period of 12 years before the discharge of consumer debt. 
                                                      
1 The terms ‘insolvency’ and ‘bankruptcy’ are used interchangeably in this Working Document. 
2 As stated by Samuel J. Gerdano, Executive Director of the American Bankruptcy Institute 
(http://www.abiworld.org). 
3 Official numbers can be found at the US Federal Reserve (http://www.federalreserve.gov). 
4 Data for the euro area is according to the composition of the eurozone in the respective year. Numbers 
on write-downs of monetary financial institutions in the euro area can be found at the ECB’s website 
(http://www.ecb.eu). 2 | MARIA GERHARDT 
Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. While creditors tend to have greater 
legal means for the recuperation of outstanding loans in European countries, in the US they may 
be forced to write off huge amounts when debtors are being granted debt discharges. At the 
same time consumers might prefer the US legislation, permitting them to rid themselves of debt 
quickly and encouraging new spending. Insolvency laws are crucial in the context of the 
ongoing crisis as they determine how consumer debt may be cancelled – representing further 
losses to creditors. The possible impact, effects and consequences of different bankruptcy 
procedures is therefore an important question.  
2.  The US: Fast track to debt discharge  
In the US, bankruptcy legislation is clearly consumer-oriented. Once admitted to bankruptcy 
proceedings, consumers are protected in several ways, for instance by high exemption rules that 
allow them to keep a large share or all of their property. In a few US states, such as California 
and Arizona, consumers may also be shielded from the consequences of unpaid housing loans, 
as their loans are of a ‘no recourse’ nature
5 under certain conditions laid down by the respective 
real estate regulation. This type of loan offers homeowners the possibility to exit mortgages by 
simply leaving the collateral to the creditor, without being held personally liable for any loss in 
value. No recourse loans generally favour borrowers, because they can walk out on their loans 
and penalise mortgage providers if they are left with depreciated collateral. In most states, 
creditors can file for a deficiency judgement if foreclosure did not yield enough funds to repay a 
mortgage.
6 However, if a debtor has lost his house to foreclosure the chances of collecting a 
deficiency statement are not very high. 
Consumer and business insolvency is regulated by federal law under the US Bankruptcy Code. 
The principal purposes of the bankruptcy law are, firstly, to give an honest debtor a ‘fresh start’ 
in life by relieving him of most of the debts and secondly, to repay creditors in an orderly 
manner to the extent that the debtor has assets available for payment. The order of the two 
purposes clearly reflects the strong focus on debtors’ interests. Individuals can apply for 
bankruptcy under Chapters 7, 11 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, although Chapter 11 is mostly 
applied to businesses. The majority of consumer bankruptcies are processed under Chapter 7: in 
2008, 67% of all non-business bankruptcies were filed under Chapter 7 and the other 33% under 
Chapter 13. 
Under Chapter 7, any individual may apply for insolvency, irrespective of the amount. The 
procedure foresees that the debtor turns over all the non-exempt parts of his property to a trustee 
for liquidation purposes, and the proceeds are then distributed to the creditors.
7 However, since 
there is often little or no non-exempt property in Chapter 7 cases, liquidation may actually not 
take place, which is why they are frequently referred to as “no-asset cases”. Following the 
liquidation of non-exempt assets, the remaining debt may be relieved immediately.
8  
                                                      
5 The ‘no recourse’ specificity is not part of federal bankruptcy legislation, but related to the loan 
contract. 
6 Deficiency judgements are allowed in 44 out of the 50 states, according to A. Crews Cutts, and R.K. 
Green (2004), Innovative servicing technology: Smart enough to keep people in their houses?, Working 
Paper BABC 04-19, Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University, February. 
7 As mentioned above, the non-exempt part of property depends on state law, which varies widely but 
may include equity in a home or car, tools of the trade or some personal effects. 
8 Certain debts are not dischargeable under Chapter 7, for instance debts for alimony and child support, 
certain taxes or debts for certain criminal restitution orders. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY REGIMES IN THE US AND EUROPE | 3 
Even though insolvency regulation is covered by US federal law, exemption law is regulated at 
both the federal and state levels. In principle, state regulation applies, but many states allow 
debtors to choose between state and federal exemption law. Depending on the state, debtors may 
therefore save different amounts of their assets; for personal property
9 many states provide for 
exemptions of $15,000-$50,000 and the federal regulation for a total of around $45,000. All 
states also allow for homestead exemption, permitting debtors to keep a share of or all of their 
principal residence. Federal regulation specifies a homestead exemption of $136,875, in most 
states that amount is below $100,000, but it varies widely across states. The regulations of 
homestead exemptions have become more generous in past years, and even Delaware, which 
did not allow for any home equity to be saved previously, passed a bill in 2005 fixing a 
threshold for homestead exemption at $50,000. In several states, for instance Florida or Texas, 
state regulation does not even set any monetary limitation to homestead exemption; so if the 
debtor is admitted to Chapter 7, he may receive a debt discharge and still be able to keep his 
home.  
The varying exemption provisions imply that creditors may be able to recuperate different 
amounts of their outstanding loan, depending on the state in which the debtor resides. The cost 
of providing credit consequently differs across states, since lenders may be forced to write off 
higher amounts in some states. This could lead to the conjecture that lenders may set interest 
rates according to their cost and possibility to enforce claims; the variation between interest 
rates for mortgages and consumer loans is surprisingly small, however, with a variance of 
around 0.5%. 
When considering the number of consumer bankruptcy cases, the level of homestead and 
property exemptions can become significant, since loose exemption laws are positively related 
to bankruptcy filings, as has been argued by Gropp et al.
10 It is more probable that consumers 
file for bankruptcy and ask for a debt cancellation if they can keep most of their assets; this 
implies that under higher exemption provisions people are more likely to behave 
opportunistically. Gropp et al. state that bankruptcy exemptions can therefore actually be 
interpreted as partial wealth insurance. Taking this interpretation a step further leads us to the 
concept of moral hazard. In the context of insolvency and exemption provisions, moral hazard 
implies that debtors behave differently with generous exemption laws in place because they are 
running a lower risk of losing their assets. Debtors may engage in loan contracts less cautiously 
because they do not have to worry about losing their property in the event of insolvency. 
The whole procedure of Chapter 7 cases generally lasts 4 months, and according to the US 
Courts, more than 99% of individual debtors admitted to the chapter receive a discharge. Under 
Chapter 7, consumers have the advantage that debts are discharged with no future obligation; 
they do not have to comply with any rules or periods of good conduct. This implies that in those 
cases where bankrupts do not own any non-exempt property, they may enjoy a fast track to 
discharge, with only a slight penalty incurred for default. This contrasts sharply with European 
countries, as discussed below. 
Under Chapter 13, a debtor may save a greater share of his property, but it does not include 
immediate debt relief, rather a ‘reorganization’ of debt in order to reach a settlement plan. 
Under this plan, the debtor repays part or all of his debt over 3 to 5 years – depending on the 
individual's monthly income – and the remaining debt may be discharged upon completion of 
                                                      
9 Personal property mostly includes items such as cars, household furnishings, clothes or jewellery. 
10 R. Gropp, J. Scholz & M. White (1997), “Personal bankruptcy and credit supply and demand”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1), pp. 217-251. 4 | MARIA GERHARDT 
the settlement. For creditors, Chapter 13 is preferable, because of the higher chance of obtaining 
a larger part of the outstanding loan. 
The decision to file under Chapter 7 or 13 partly depends on the debtor’s monthly income; 
individuals with a higher income need to apply for Chapter 13. For debtors, the advantages of 
Chapter 13 over 7 are that (1) the debtor gets to keep a greater part of his property and (2) some 
of the debt that cannot be discharged under Chapter 7 may be discharged under 13, such as 
debts for malicious injury to property or debts arising from property settlements in separation 
proceedings. For both chapters, the frequency of discharge is not strongly limited: a Chapter 7 
discharge is possible every 6-8 years, depending on the previous relief, and a Chapter 13 
discharge only if it has not been granted in the previous 2-4 years.  
Insolvency procedures in the US were modified in 2005 by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA). The BAPCPA imposed stricter rules for bankruptcy 
applications, for instance with a restricted eligibility for Chapter 7 to limit the possibility of a 
fast debt discharge for individuals that are not completely destitute. The numbers of insolvency 
filings increased significantly in 2005 and decreased the following year, a development that was 
the result of the entry into force of the BAPCPA in 2005, as has been argued by White
11 and 
shown in Figure 1. Debtors were quick to file under the old regime before eligibility 
requirements were tightened. 
Figure 1. Delinquencies and number of consumer insolvency cases in the US
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Source: US Courts, Federal Reserve. 
                                                      
11 M. White (2008), Bankruptcy: past puzzles, recent reforms, and the mortgage crisis, National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper No. 14549. 
12 Delinquency statistics include delinquencies on all loans and leases to consumers of all commercial 
banks at the end of the respective year. The Federal Reserve classifies loans as “delinquent” once they are 
overdue by 30 days or more. 
The number of insolvency cases refers to the non-business bankruptcy cases commenced during the 
twelve month period ended on December 31
st of the respective year. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY REGIMES IN THE US AND EUROPE | 5 
2.1  Delinquency and charge-off rates 
Even though the possibility to file for bankruptcy has been limited by the BAPCPA, numbers of 
bankruptcy filings have been soaring again since 2006 (see Figure 1) and crossed the mark of 
one million cases in 2008. Moreover, this number is not likely to go down, since delinquency 
rates have been increasing across all sectors, as has been reported by the Federal Reserve. 
Within the past two years, the volume of delinquent consumer loans, excluding mortgages, at 
commercial banks has almost doubled from $23.8 billion (1
st quarter 2007, approx. €18.2 
billion) to $44.1 billion (1
st quarter 2009, approx. €33.8 billion) and keeps on rising. 
Credit card loans represent half the volume of delinquent consumer loans and the rate of non-
paid credit card bills has been increasing in past years. The official US statistics published by 
the Fed on the average delinquency rate on credit card loans of all commercial banks has 
increased from 3.96% (1
st quarter 2007) to 6.61% (1
st quarter 2009). The rising number of 
delinquencies is reflected in high charge-off rates for credit card issuers. In April 2009, 
American Express and Citigroup’s charge-off rates for credit cards stood at 10.1% and 10.2%, 
respectively. According to Reuters, analysts estimate that those rates could translate into 
potential losses of $70-75 billion for credit card issuers.  
With an outlook like this, the credit card sector is under severe strain and there is a danger of a 
credit card crisis – having as its source the same cause as the subprime bust: consumers failing 
to service their bills. Even without a major crisis in the credit card market, the fast-track debt 
relief of Chapter 7 may actually turn consumers’ discharges into creditors’ charges, 
transforming the rapid benefit of one party into the rapid loss of another. 
2.2  Unemployment and insolvency 
One factor that is of great significance for insolvency is unemployment, and it has been 
identified as one of the main reasons why people file for insolvency. This has been confirmed 
by several studies, among which a survey
 conducted amongst participants of credit counselling 
courses of the Institute for Financial Literacy.
13 In this study, job loss was cited as one of the 
four most prominent reasons for financial distress in the US. Further, according to Elizabeth 
Warren, Professor at Harvard Law School, job loss, illness, and family breakup are stated as the 
reasons for nearly 90% of bankruptcies.
14 In Fay et al. the probability of filing for bankruptcy 
increases with lower employment income,
15 so job loss contributes to more insolvency filings. 
In the past few years, unemployment and insolvency have been showing similar trends, as can 
be seen in Figure 2, below. The BAPCPA caused a massive break in insolvency data for 
2005/06; the graph therefore strongly deviates for those two years, whereas the unemployment 
rate has evidently not been affected by the change in bankruptcy legislation (see Figure 2). The 
most recent numbers for US unemployment reached an alarming 9.4% in May 2009.
16 With job 
loss being one of the major reasons for insolvency, and unemployment being a lagging 
indicator, the number of bankruptcy cases that are yet to come is expected to increase. Since 
Chapter 7 enables a fast discharge for individuals, the combination of rising unemployment 
                                                      
13 Institute for Financial Literacy (2007), 2007 Annual Consumer Bankruptcy Demographics Report. 
14 E. Warren & A. Warren Tyagi (2005), “What’s Hurting the Middle Class – The myth of overspending 
obscures the real problem”, Boston Review (http://bostonreview.net/BR30.5/warrentyagi.html). 
15 S. Fay, E. Hurst & M. White (2002), “The Household Bankruptcy Decision”, American Economic 
Review 92 (3), pp. 706-718. 
16 For comparison purposes, May’s figures for US unemployment for 2007 and 2008 were at 4.5% and 
5.5%, respectively. 6 | MARIA GERHARDT 
together with financial distress will again heighten the volume of write-offs and losses that 
creditors have to bear in the near future. 
Figure 2. US unemployment rate and number of consumer insolvency cases 
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3.  The UK: Shortened period of good conduct and decrease in stigma 
Research on consumer bankruptcy in Europe has not been as extensive as in the US, 
nevertheless some similar trends can be observed. Of the European countries, the UK’s 
bankruptcy legislation is the one that most resembles the US approach on consumer insolvency, 
but is still stricter than the American provisions. 
The Insolvency Act and Insolvency Rules, both of 1986, regulate personal and corporate 
bankruptcy in the UK. Various sections of the act have been modified by Part 10 of the 
Enterprise Act 2002,
17 most importantly the length of the period of good conduct before debt 
discharge, which has been shortened from 3 years to 12 months in order to ease consumers’ 
financial distress.
18  
In England and Wales, any debtor or creditor can file for bankruptcy given that the debtor fails 
to make his payments. Once the court decides to issue a bankruptcy order against the debtor, his 
assets are all transferred to a trustee. The property that may be exempted is limited to those 
possessions that the debtor needs in his employment or home; all other assets of value, 
including the home itself, have to be turned in for liquidation.
19 It needs to be stressed that the 
UK borrower certainly does not benefit from the same debtor protection as in the US, because 
he is most likely to lose any house equity and realisable asset of value. 
                                                      
17 The individual insolvency provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002 came into force on 1 April 2004. 
18 This section outlines the proceedings in England and Wales; Scotland and Northern Ireland have 
separate insolvency services and divisions. 
19 Several alternatives to bankruptcy are possible if the debtor wishes to save his property, for instance an 
informal arrangement with creditors or an Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVA) with the creditors, 
which is a formal arrangement supervised by an insolvency practitioner. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY REGIMES IN THE US AND EUROPE | 7 
After one year, the debtor is automatically (!) discharged from his debt, with a few exceptions 
that are not dischargeable, such as court fines or student loans. Remarkably, no further decision 
by a judge is necessary once the 12 months have elapsed. The debt relief may even be issued 
earlier if an officer of the court files a notice in court upon conclusion of his enquiries. 
The numbers of consumer bankruptcy cases in England and Wales rose strongly after 2004, 
when the period of good conduct was effectively reduced from 3 years to 12 months: the 
number of insolvency cases tripled from 35,604 in 2003 to 106,544 in 2008. Besides the shorter 
period of good conduct, the rising bankruptcy numbers are also paired with increasing levels of 
household indebtedness and a decrease in the stigma associated with insolvency.
20 As has been 
revealed in a study by the UK Insolvency Service, bankruptcy stigma is becoming less 
significant.
21 The results of two surveys conducted in 2004 and 2006/2007 show that there has 
been a decrease in the stigma perception amongst individuals, which implies that bankruptcy is 
becoming more socially acceptable.  
The recent reduction of the period of good conduct from 3 years to 12 months in the UK clearly 
shows the intention to render the legal avenue of insolvency to resolve difficulties between 
debtors and creditors more accessible. The rising number of insolvency filings and decreasing 
level of stigmatisation are therefore not surprising. Since the volume of household borrowing 
has not been increasing drastically with the modification of the period of good conduct, it 
remains to be seen whether the step towards easier insolvency regulation may also translate into 
more irresponsible borrowing.  
4.  Ireland: Consumers may stay bankrupt forever 
Ireland is one of the European countries with rather stringent insolvency legislation for 
consumers, especially when compared to the neighbouring UK. Bankruptcy regulation dates 
from 1988/1989 and has not undergone any major reform since.
22 
Any debtor can apply for bankruptcy at the High Court; creditors may also submit a petition in 
case the debtor has not followed a payment summons within the previous three months. As is 
the case in the UK, once the court issues a bankruptcy order, all the debtors’ property, including 
his family home, is transferred to the trustee who will liquidate the assets for the benefit of the 
creditors. The amount of exempted ‘essentials’ that may be saved from liquidation is limited to 
a comparatively low value of €3,100 (or more if approved by court). In addition to the property 
sale, the High Court may also decide to appropriate salary or pensions. Creditors with secured 
claims, such as mortgages, may sell the asset that constitutes the security.  
Once declared bankrupt, any debtor remains bankrupt until the High Court decides to have the 
debt relieved, since Irish legislation does not foresee any automatic discharge. Debt relief may 
be granted only if certain conditions have been met, for example after creditors have been paid 
in full or after a period of good conduct of 12 years.
23 
                                                      
20 Total credit to households per capita rose by 21% in the period 2003-2008: from GBP 14,500 to GBP 
17,500 (from €19,200 to €22,200, with the respective end of year exchange rates). 
All figures and calculations on consumer credit and mortgage loans in this Working Document are based 
on the ECRI Statistical Package (http://www.ecri.eu). 
21 The Insolvency Service (2007), Attitudes to Bankruptcy Revisited (http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/).  
22 Bankruptcy Act, 1988, and the Bankruptcy rules and forms, Order 76. 
23 In addition to those impositions, certain penalties apply, for instance the bankrupt is not allowed to 
manage a company, to hold elected representative office and his bankruptcy is permanently recorded – 
even after discharge – at the Bankruptcy Register. 8 | MARIA GERHARDT 
All these requirements impose a heavy and costly burden upon consumers. Consequently, 
debtors often try to negotiate debt arrangements with their creditors in order to avoid official 
insolvency. Consumer bankruptcy procedures are seldom used in Ireland, as can be seen from 
the low number of actual adjudications: in 2007, only 5 persons were declared bankrupt, 10 
were discharged from their debt, and those numbers have remained rather stable in recent years. 
This is surprising indeed since Ireland has been experiencing a strong housing bubble with 
mortgage volumes having increased steadily from 20% of GDP (1998) to 65% (2007); going 
down again slightly to 62% of GDP in 2008. The multiplication of outstanding debt has so far 
not led to more bankruptcy cases. Neither has the repossession activity by lenders increased, as 
has been confirmed by the Irish Banking Federation (IBF). Of the total number of mortgages 
used in 2008, only 0.01% of houses have been repossessed by creditors in Ireland; a very low 
rate when compared to the UK, where the repossession rate is 35 times higher.
24 
The relatively steady position of Irish creditors is mostly due to the renegotiations commonly 
attempted between debtors and creditors in order to solve financial difficulties before going to 
court. The Code of Practice on Mortgage Arrears that has been issued by the Irish Banking 
Federation urges lenders to consider renegotiation and to assist the borrowers as far as 
possible.
25 
Even though Irish insolvency legislation clearly gives priority to creditors’ rights and represents 
a heavy burden on bankrupts, the requirements are exacting enough to encourage debtors and 
creditors to find other solutions for recovery. Renegotiation plays an important role, and is 
actually strongly recommended in the official IBF code of conduct. Consumers may therefore 
receive favourable treatment from the industry when sorting out financial difficulties.  
5.  Germany: Six years to debt relief 
The provisions of Germany's insolvency procedures could be placed somewhere between those 
of the UK and Ireland. The German Insolvency Regulation (Insolvenzordnung) covers company 
and consumer insolvency and entered into force on 1 January 1999. Its first and foremost aim is 
the best possible satisfaction of the creditors, at the same time giving the debtor the chance to 
recover from insolvency. For consumers, the major change and benefit of the new insolvency 
regulation of 1999 was the introduction of the possibility to have remaining debt discharged 
after a preceding period of good conduct. Any debtor is eligible to apply for the programme, if 
he is insolvent or about to become so.  
German bankruptcy procedures foresee three phases: first, an obligatory out-of-court 
negotiation between the debtor and creditors, secondly, an in-court settlement phase and then, 
possibly, a third phase of a period of good conduct that could be followed by debt cancellation. 
Remarkably the initial out-of-court negotiation is compulsory, and only if no agreement is 
reached during the first and second phases, may the debtor apply for admittance to the debt 
discharge option (Restschuldbefreiung). If the court approves, the debtor has to fulfil several 
conditions over six years of good conduct, during which a sizeable part of the debtor’s income 
is transferred to a trustee who then distributes it to the creditors. Property may be seized as well. 
At the end of the six years, the court decides whether the residual debt is relieved, and such a 
discharge is only possible once every ten years.  
                                                      
24 The figures are taken from the IBF’s website (http://www.ibf.ie).  
25 The IBF Code of Practice can be found at http://www.ibf.ie/pdfs/codes/mortgage_arrears.pdf. CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY REGIMES IN THE US AND EUROPE | 9 
Bankruptcy carries with it a considerable stigma of failure in German society, and the fear of 
financial ruin is very common, as was stated in a report of 2002 to the European Commission.
26 
The word for debt (‘Schuld’) already has a negative connotation, as not only does it translate to 
debt but also to ‘guilt’ and ‘blame’ – both meanings combined in one word.  
Nevertheless, the number of insolvency proceedings has been increasing drastically in recent 
years. From 1999, when the new insolvency regulation entered into force, to 2007, the number 
of consumer bankruptcy cases that were accepted at court increased constantly from 1,634 to 
103,085, an explosive development within a few years. 2008 marked the first year that 
consumer insolvency cases decreased to 95,730. In the same years, the total amount of credit to 
households rose by only 5% to €1,393 billions in 2008, an increase that is far from proportional 
to the development in bankruptcy filings. Applying for insolvency has surely become much 
more attractive to consumers with the introduction of the debt discharge in 1999. 
According to a survey by Backert et al.
27 conducted in Germany in 2005/2006, the most 
frequently cited reasons for filing for insolvency were unemployment, “loss of financial 
overview” and divorce. Even though the unemployment rate has been going down in recent 
years to 7.3% in 2008, bankruptcy filings have been not de- but increasing. However the latest 
forecasts from the IMF estimate that unemployment will rise again to a possible 10.8% in 2010. 
If job loss is indeed the primary reason for consumer insolvency applications, the estimated rise 
in unemployment is likely to lead to more consumer insolvency filings. Nevertheless, creditors 
in Germany are not in such a precarious position, as they may expect some form of contribution 
from debtors during the prescribed six years of good conduct.  
6.  France: Debt discharge gains importance 
Some aspects of the French insolvency procedure are comparable to the German system, for 
instance the possibility of out-of-court settlement as well as debt discharge after a period of 
good conduct. Consumer insolvency regulation was introduced in France in 1989, with a 
modification of the Consumption Code (Code de la consommation). The initial approach only 
provided for the option of debt settlement plans; partial and total debt discharge was not 
included until another amendment to the code in 1998, in order to respond to the increasing 
importance of private over-indebtedness. The code is currently being revised and is likely to be 
modified again in 2009/2010 with the aim of providing for better consumer protection, fostering 
responsible lending and implementing the European consumer credit directive of 2008.  
If consumers find themselves in a situation of over-indebtedness – defined as the impossibility 
of meeting debt obligations – they may refer to the 'household debt commission' to start a 
procedure, situated at the French Central Bank.
28 The request is likely to be accepted as long as 
the over-indebtedness is permanent and not due to temporary circumstances, and the declaration 
has been made in good faith. There is no cost associated to the application. The commission 
then assesses the level of indebtedness and decides between two procedures: either the 
                                                      
26 Philippe & Partners (2002), Bankruptcy and a fresh start: Stigma on failure and legal consequences of 
bankruptcy (http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/entrepreneurship/sme2chance/doc/report_germ.pdf). 
27 W. Backert, D. Brock, G. Lechner & K. Maischatz (2007), “Bankruptcy in Germany: Filing Rates and 
the People behind the numbers”, paper prepared for the 2007 Joint Meetings of The Law and Society 
Association and The Research Committee on Sociology of Law (ISA) at Humboldt University, Berlin, 
Germany. 
28 The over-indebtedness commission is made up of representatives from the prefecture, a consumer 
association, a credit institute, the treasury, the tax service, the Banque de France, as well as a lawyer and 
social worker. The aim of the commission is to reach a debt settlement agreement between the debtor and 
creditors. 10 | MARIA GERHARDT 
negotiation of a settlement plan or the “personal reestablishment” procedure. The former is a 
negotiated amicable settlement proposition by the commission that may last up to 10 years. For 
this plan to be effective, it needs approval by the debtor and the principal creditors.  
If no agreement can be reached, the commission may propose a moratorium of two years,
29 after 
which the case will be reassessed. It can also make recommendations that may be imposed by 
court, for instance the rescheduling and reduction of debt. If, after reassessment of the case, the 
debtor's situation is still hopeless, the commission may recommend the opening of the “personal 
reestablishment” procedure in court. This step entails either an obligatory settlement plan 
imposed by the judge or the liquidation of the debtor’s assets. The settlement plan may again 
have a maximum length of 10 years; however, practice shows that in half of the cases such a 
plan does not exceed 5 years.
30 If the judge decides to have the property sold, the debtor may 
nevertheless keep a share of his assets and of his income in order to cover living expenses. His 
home may be subject to foreclosure. Upon conclusion of the reestablishment procedure – which 
is either after the settlement plan or directly after liquidation – the debtor may enjoy partial or 
total debt discharge.  
As is the case in other European countries, there is a strong focus on negotiating an amicable 
settlement in France before further steps in the bankruptcy procedure are taken. In fact, in 2008, 
159,967 applications were admitted to the household debt commission and 87,673 amicable 
settlement plans were negotiated, which is more than half the number of newly admitted cases. 
Yet, it can be observed that the number of amicable settlement plans as a share of admitted files 
used to be higher, ranging between 63-69% for the years 1998-2003. This is most likely due to 
the introduction of the “personal reestablishment” procedure in 2004, which facilitates the debt 
discharge imposed by the judge. Since 2004, the number of cases admitted to personal 
reestablishment has doubled from 16,321 to 33,378 in 2008, while the total number of cases 
admitted has only increased by 4% over the same period. 
According to a report by an enquiry commission at the French Senate,
31 there has been a shift in 
causes of over-indebtedness in the past ten years from ‘active over-indebtedness’ through 
irresponsible borrowing, over-consumption and costly accommodation, to ‘passive over-
indebtedness’ because of a decrease in resources, for instance through job loss, illness or 
divorce.
32 These developments made amendments to bankruptcy law necessary at the turn of the 
century. In fact, investigations published by the Banque de France in 2001, 2004 and 2007 show 
that while 64% of over-indebtedness were classified as ‘passive’ in 2001, this share increased 
throughout the years to 75% in 2007.
33 For all three investigations, unemployment turned out to 
be the primary reason for over-indebtedness: in 2007, 32% of individuals quoted unemployment 
as the cause of their unfortunate situation, while divorce (15%), too much credit (14%) and 
illness (11%) were cited much less frequently.  
                                                      
29 The moratorium implies a suspension of debt repayment and a reassessment of the case by the 
commission after two years. 
30 Source: Enquête typologique 2007 sur le surendettement, Banque de France. 
31 Source: Rapport n° 447 (2008-2009) of Senator Philippe Dominati. 
32 “Active over-indebtedness” comprises the following causes: too much credit, mismanagement, costly 
accommodation, excessive charges and other, while “passive over-indebtedness” involves job 
loss/unemployment, separation/divorce, illness/accident, declining resources, death and other. 
33 The investigations were based on the debtors' applications submitted to the household debt 
commissions. All publications can be found at the website of the Banque de France (http://www.banque-
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These results are in line with the outcomes of the previously mentioned surveys that had been 
carried out in Germany and the US, demonstrating that reasons for over-indebtedness are 
comparable across several countries. They also confirm the positive correlation between 
unemployment and over-indebtedness, meaning that the country is likely to see more insolvency 
filings with a rising unemployment rate. Considering the unemployment rate forecast for 
France, higher over-indebtedness and more bankruptcy cases are likely to come up, since the 
rate is estimated to rise by 2% to 9.6% in 2009.
34 
7.  Spain: No debt discharge possible 
In Spain, consumer bankruptcy began to be regulated only a few years ago, with the Law of 9 
July 2003 (Ley 22-2003, de 9 de julio, Concursal). Before, insolvency legislation was limited to 
companies only. Any debtor who is (about to be) insolvent may file for bankruptcy at a 
commercial court. Creditors may do so as well, but have to prove that the debtor is insolvent. In 
general, insolvency proceedings do not affect creditors whose claims are secured by collateral. 
At the beginning of the procedure, an inventory of the debtor’s assets is established, and then a 
possible settlement plan is discussed. For consumers, two outcomes of the settlement plan are 
possible: (a) a reduction of the debt (max. half of the amount) or (b) an extension of the 
payment period (max. five years). Liquidation of assets is primarily provided for business 
insolvency. In contrast to the other countries outlined above, Spanish legislation does not 
foresee a debt discharge for consumers. This clearly rules out the fresh start for consumers that 
would be given by debt relief.  
According to Professor Javier Arias Varona, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos in Madrid, two 
aspects are important in the discussion of the absence of a consumers' discharge:
 first, consumer 
indebtedness was traditionally lower in Spain than in other European countries
35 (Figures A1 
and A2 in the Annex). Furthermore, as is the case in Ireland, the UK and the US, Spanish 
consumers are mostly indebted with mortgage credits, hence loans backed by collateral, where 
creditors may enforce their rights. Secondly, Professor Varona points to the fact that Spain did 
not have a procedure for consumer insolvency in place before, and after decades of discussion, 
passing that law already implied a major change, so people paid less attention to the request to 
include the possibility of debt discharge as well. 
The non-existence of consumer bankruptcy procedures before 2004 is reflected in the low 
numbers of filings as well. In 2005, only 60 individuals without a business activity applied for 
insolvency procedures. This number rose to 96 (2007), jumped to 374 (2008) and even reached 
200 consumer bankruptcy filings in the 1
st quarter of 2009.
36 These numbers are extremely low, 
compared to the million consumer insolvency filings in the US for 2008, nevertheless a strong 
upward trend can be observed in the recent months of the crisis. 
8.  Italy: No consumer insolvency legislation 
The only larger EU Member State that does not have any consumer insolvency legislation in 
place is Italy. The introduction of a bankruptcy law for individuals has been on the agenda for 
several years and a project of law is currently being discussed in the Senate. It foresees an 
amendment of the Italian usury law in order to include a formalized consumer insolvency 
                                                      
34 Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database April 2009. 
35 On Credit Slips: “Consumer Bankruptcy in Europe (II): Spain is Different!” 
(http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2007/07/consumer-bank-2.html). 
36 Numbers of individual insolvency filings are taken from the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
(http://www.ine.es). 12 | MARIA GERHARDT 
procedure.
37 The provisions that are currently on the table are similar to the Spanish approach, 
where consumer debt is restructured over a settlement plan of a maximum 5 years. 
The legislation that is currently being applied in the case of consumer non-payment of loans is 
the Italian Civil Code. According to this code, creditors may file for enforcement of their claims 
as soon as debts are due. The enforcement may then be carried out through wage garnishments 
and distraint of the debtor’s assets, including his home. When it comes to non-payment of 
outstanding loans, the level of consumer protection is therefore very low in Italy. The debtor has 
little chance of defending himself if he is not able to make the necessary payments.  
9.  Household credit and consumer bankruptcy 
Credit to households and non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH), which is 
composed of consumer credit, mortgages and other loans, has increased considerably in Europe 
and the US over the past decade. This development is remarkably strong in the US, with a 
relative increase of approximately 50%. In the euro area, credit growth has not been as strong, 
which is mostly due to the fact that it has remained relatively stable in Germany. Other smaller 
economies like Ireland, Spain and Greece actually experienced increases of total credit to 
households – both in absolute and relative terms – that were greater than those in the US, except 
for 2008. 
Table 1. Total credit to households and NPISH as % of GDP 
  Euro area  UK  US 
1999  43.6 n.a. 66.5 
2000  44.6 66.7 68.8 
2001  44.9 69.1 73.2 
2002  45.8 73.1 78.6 
2003  47.2 75.7 84.0 
2004  49.2 77.8 87.9 
2005  52.1 77.6 92.0 
2006  53.9 77.4 95.4 
2007  54.3 76.1 97.0 
2008  54.0 72.3 94.1 
Source: ECRI Statistical Package 2009. 
While consumer credit (comprising all credit for consumption purposes, notably also credit card 
and overdraft loans) has stayed at the same level over the past years, the total credit growth can 
mainly be attributed to the developments in mortgage lending, as can be seen in Figures 3 and 4 
(see Figures A1 and A2 in Annex for more data on Europe).  
In the context of insolvency matters, the most significant difference between consumer and 
mortgage credit is that the latter is secured by collateral; hence there remains the possibility for 
creditors to enforce the underlying security in the case of consumer default. This distinction 
becomes important when comparing insolvency regulations because few countries (the US, see 
Table A1 in the Annex) allow debtors to keep their homes, while in most countries housing is 
not exempt from bankruptcy procedures. Instead, it is often treated as priority debt obligation 
                                                      
37 The document “Disegno di legge” of 30 April 2008 can be found on the Italian Senate’s website 
(http://www.senato.it/leg/16/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/testi/29935_testi.htm). CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY REGIMES IN THE US AND EUROPE | 13 
and may be liquidated, giving creditors the possibility to recuperate part of the loan. In Spain, 
housing loans are not obligatorily included in insolvency proceedings and creditors have the 
right to enforce their claims. Such consumer insolvency procedures may then not necessarily 
suit households, if they are primarily indebted with mortgages (as is generally the case in 
Spain). 
For both consumer and mortgage credit, the US and UK have higher shares of household 
borrowing than other countries (see Figures 3 and 4). This is surprising indeed, since these two 
countries are also the ones in which pending debt obligations may be discharged more easily. 
From a consumer's point of view, this is only understandable; any borrowing represents less of a 
strain he can be easily freed of the burden. However, it is astonishing that lenders are willing to 
provide credit even though they may lose their right to the claim if the consumer's bankruptcy 
procedure is successful. Even more surprising is that interest rates, which incorporate the cost of 
providing credit, do not differ markedly between countries in Europe or between states in the 
US.  
Figure 3. Consumer credit as % of GDP 
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Figure 4. Mortgage credit as % of GDP 
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Source for both figures: ECRI Statistical Package 2009. 
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Mortgage credit has increased significantly in Spain and Ireland in recent years – two countries 
that have experienced a strong housing bubble, as a result of low interest rates, economic 
growth and an increase in demand for housing (see Figure A2 in the Annex). For both countries, 
mortgage credit as a % of GDP has tripled over the past decade from around 20% to 60%. In 
Spain, not only has the volume of mortgages grown, but also the volume of non-performing 
mortgages. The amount of home loans that are delinquent for more than 3 months was at €0.9 
billion in 2004, slowly rising to €4.2 billion in 2007 and then jumping to €14.8 billion in 2008.
38 
The total impairment losses at banks reached €16.2 billion in 2008, around four times the value 
of 2005.  
Comparing the losses stemming from non-payment of household credit at banks in Europe and 
the US shows that this problem is much less severe in Europe, as can be seen from the charge-
off rates at banks in the euro area and the US in Table 2. According to the ECB, the total write-
offs for consumer, mortgage and other credit for the euro area amounted to €13.9 billion in 
2008. For the same credit segments in the US, this amount is four times as high at €52.9 billion. 
An interesting development for the euro area is the slowly increasing importance of consumer 
loan write-offs (that include credit cards and account overdrafts), while losses from mortgage 
and other credit have remained stable, if not decreased. In the US, on the other hand, charge-offs 
for all types of credit have gone up, as can be seen in the table below. The difference between 
loss development in the US and Europe is especially strong in the mortgage sector, which comes 
as no surprise, since most European consumer lose their residence in the case of non-payment, 
while US debtors can often keep their homes throughout the bankruptcy procedure. 
Table 2. Consumer credit and write-offs at banks in the US and euro area 
Consumer credit  Mortgage credit  Other credit    
cons. credit, 
in € billion 
charge-off 
rate, % 
mort. credit, 
in € billion 
charge-off 
rate, % 
other credit, 
in € billion 
charge-off 
rate, % 
2003  484.5 0.6  2360.5  0.1 675.6 1.1 
2004  515.4 0.6  2591.5  0.1 701.5 1.0 
2005  554.1 0.7  2907.9  0.2 719.5 1.4 
2006  586.5 0.7  3198.4  0.1 737.8 0.9 
2007  618.4 0.7  3423.3  0.1 753.2 0.9 
 
 
Euro 
area 
 
  2008  632.9 0.7  3484.8  0.1 770.5 0.9 
2003  1666.2 3.1 5451.3 0.4  168.5  1.5 
2004  1629.4 2.8 5754.8 0.1  154.5  1.6 
2005  1961.4 3.2 7526.7 0.1  194.8  1.4 
2006  1836.2 2.4 7474.1 0.2  230.8  1.4 
2007  1733.5 2.8 7129.2 0.5  232.2  2.0 
 
 
 
US 
 
 
2008  1865.5 4.2 7511.5 1.6  264.9  2.9 
Notes: Total credit numbers are end-of-year amounts taken from the ECB (euro-area) and the ECRI 
Statistical Package 2009 (US). The charge-off rates for the euro area are total write-offs as a 
percentage of outstanding loans, based on annual amounts; US rates are end-of-year rates taken 
from the FED calculations, which are based on average loan volumes, NOT the total credit 
numbers indicated in the table above.  
Sources: ECB, Federal Reserve, ECRI Statistical Package 2009, own calculations. 
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10.  Comparing the US and Europe – an overview  
This Working Document takes a comparative look at insolvency regulation in the US and 
Europe, and concludes that the differences are indeed striking. Table A1 in the Annex gives an 
overview of the salient features of insolvency laws in effect in selected European countries and 
the United States. As can be seen in the table, the differences relate to many aspects, for 
instance the purpose and aim of the laws. Whereas the US focuses on providing a fresh start and 
a clean slate for consumers, European insolvency legislation mostly aims at the satisfaction of 
creditors’ claims. Whereas the US focuses on providing a fresh start and a clean slate for 
consumers, European insolvency legislation mostly aims to satisfy the claims of the creditors. 
Even though creditors’ rights to recuperate outstanding loans are severely limited in the US, it is 
remarkable that this did not prevent lenders from giving out easy credit in the past. However, 
with the collapse of the subprime loan system, lending standards have tightened considerably 
and the credit made available to consumers has decreased.  
In Europe, the legislation in the UK can be considered as the most ‘consumer-friendly;’ 
nevertheless, consumers’ property is a long way from being as protected as in the US. Creditors 
therefore have more possibility to enforce their claims. It is common that under several 
European insolvency laws debtors have to give up most of their property – including their 
homes – in order to serve creditors’ claims (see Table A1). Even though the regulations on 
liquidation of assets and exemption provisions vary across European countries, interest rates are 
not strongly affected by these differences. As is the case in the US, interest rates for consumer 
loans and mortgages are similar across the above-mentioned states; national insolvency 
regulation does not appear to play a strong part in interest rate calculation.
39  
In addition to giving up most of their property, European debtors typically have to undergo a 
period of good conduct with a settlement plan to make a contribution to debt service. As has 
been remarked by Niemi-Kiesiläinen,
40 these aspects attach certain moral attributes from the 
debtors’ side to insolvency procedures in Europe, because debtors have to make an effort and 
show good intent. 
In all the countries outlined above, an increasing number of consumer bankruptcy filings can be 
observed. Due to widely differing legislation, one needs to be cautious in comparing absolute 
numbers of insolvency filings, since this can easily lead to misinterpretations and a distorted 
picture. National statistics have to be put in the national context and interpreted accordingly. 
Table 3 below presents the number of insolvency cases across the six countries discussed above. 
It needs to be stressed that for the first four countries, the numbers are relative (that is, per 
10,000 inhabitants), while for Spain and Ireland absolute figures are indicated due to the low 
number of filings. Whereas the number of insolvency cases has been growing slowly in Ireland, 
the pace and the relative numbers have been much higher in the US, the UK and Germany, as 
can be seen in Table 3. In the US, property protection and exemption levels play an important 
role when making the decision to file. In Germany, the introduction of consumer debt discharge 
in 1999 certainly made insolvency more appealing. For the UK, numbers have been rising after 
the shortage of the period of good conduct in 2004. In France, the number of applications 
admitted to the debt restructuring process has only increased slowly in recent years; however 
there has been a shift from amicable settlement plans to compulsory plans that are more likely to 
end in partial or total debt discharge. The number of such compulsory plans has increased 
                                                      
39 Comparing lenders’ interest rates across countries always remains difficult, since many factors play a 
role, such as the terms and conditions of credit contracts, as well as the typical repayment period, interest 
rate determination and additional fees. 
40 J. Niemi-Kiesiläinen (1999), “Consumer bankruptcy in comparison: Do we cure a market failure or a 
social problem?”, Osgoode Hall Law Journal 37 (1&2), pp. 473-503.  16 | MARIA GERHARDT 
significantly (see Table 3), which is most likely due to the change of the law in 2004, 
facilitating debt discharge imposed by the judge. Spanish figures are also comparatively low, 
but consumer insolvency filings have experienced a significant increase since the introduction 
of the regulation in 2004. 
Table 3. Insolvency cases across selected countries 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Insolvency cases 
per 10,000 inhabitants            
USA  46 43 51 53 56 53 69 20 27 35 
England  and  Wales  6 6 6 6 7 9  13  20  20  20 
Germany  <1  1 1 2 4 6 8  11  13  12 
France  2 3 4 4 4 8 8 9 9  11 
Absolute numbers            
Spain        4  60  53  96  374 
Ireland    4 6 4 5 5 9  10  5   
Notes: The US figures indicate the total number of bankruptcy filings at the US Courts. The statistics for 
England and Wales include bankruptcy orders and debt arrangements between debtors and 
creditors. German figures comprise all insolvency procedures that were opened in court (no out-of-
court settlement plans). The French totals indicate all compulsory cases (recommendations and 
reestablishment procedures) that may end in debt discharge. For Spain, the data for 2004 refer to 
the 4th quarter only, when the new insolvency legislation entered into force. The Irish data indicate 
the number of adjudications per year. 
Sources: US Courts, UK Insolvency Service, German Federal Statistical Office, French Central Bank, 
Spanish National Statistics Institute and Irish Courts Service. 
The procedure of renegotiating the loan between creditors and debtors in order to agree on a 
new settlement plan with new conditions is much more widespread in Europe than in the US 
(see Table A1). While it is compulsory in Germany to have out-of-court discussions, Irish 
debtors tend to follow this practice voluntarily, since the status of being bankrupt carries major 
disadvantages. The number of Irish consumer bankruptcies is consequently very low, even 
during the housing bubble and crisis.  
One could of course argue that the US should also support the renegotiating process as a way to 
resolve difficulties between debtors and creditors. Re-negotiation certainly would be feasible for 
certain kinds of debt, but in the case of mortgages, this might be very difficult to realise. Many 
US mortgages have been repackaged into mortgage-backed securities. Once these are created, 
the underlying conditions of the loans may not be touched, or may only be modified by a small 
portion under the strict rules agreed upon beforehand. This almost eliminates the possibility of 
renegotiating the terms and conditions of mortgage loans in the US, as has been pointed out by 
White.
41 The same problem could arise with any other type of credit that has been re-packaged 
into asset-backed securities (ASB). In this context, credit card loans are of special interest since 
default rates have been rising significantly and many of these loans – just like mortgages – have 
been packaged into ASB.
42 
                                                      
41 M. White (2008), Bankruptcy: past puzzles, recent reforms, and the mortgage crisis, National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper No. 14549. 
42 Data on securitization volumes in the US and European countries is published by the European 
Securitization Forum in its Securitization Data Report (http://www.europeansecuritisation.com). CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY REGIMES IN THE US AND EUROPE | 17 
When it comes to cancelling debt, the UK is one of the few countries in which a discharge is 
automatic (see Table A1), so no court decision is necessary to finalise the judgement on debt 
relief. The contrary is the case in neighbouring Ireland, where debtors officially stay insolvent 
for 12 years or even indefinitely, if the court has not decided otherwise. When the discharge has 
to be approved by court, the consumer has a greater incentive to strictly follow the rules of the 
repayment plan, knowing that his behaviour will be evaluated at the end, which is evidently 
only in the creditors' interest as well. In general, European debtors must fulfil more conditions 
in order to obtain debt relief, and it is typically the case that the insolvent consumer still has to 
make some kind of payment in order to receive debt relief. Discharge is only possible with 
certain costs and efforts; it is not for free.  
One significant reason for people to file for insolvency is unemployment, as has been shown by 
surveys in the US, France and Germany. This factor is even more important during the current 
crisis, since unemployment numbers are rising and are likely to translate into more bankruptcy 
cases. The delinquency numbers for all types of loans are already increasing at the moment, as 
has been announced by central banks in the US and Spain,
43 and are likely to keep rising if 
people lose jobs and lose income. 
It seems that after housing loans, the credit card sector has been hit the hardest. Credit card 
companies in the US have been announcing very pessimistic forecasts for repayment rates for 
2009/2010. These dangers are taken very seriously, as the US government passed an Act
44 in 
May 2009 to protect American credit card holders and avoid another collapse. The rising 
delinquency and default rates on credit cards in the US make it – again – less likely to decrease 
bankruptcy filings in the near future. The problem is aggravated by the fact that many credit 
card loans in the US have been repackaged into ASB, which makes it difficult if not impossible 
to renegotiate the underlying terms of the loan contract. What the consequences are and whether 
these developments could imply a credit card bust remains to be seen. 
For the European countries outlined above, there are certainly similarities between the consumer 
insolvency laws, but it also needs to be stressed that there are still a few European states that do 
not have any bankruptcy legislation for individuals, Italy being one of them. There is no 
common insolvency procedure at EU level; the only piece of EU legislation that addresses 
bankruptcy is the Regulation on insolvency proceedings.
45 This regulation is applicable to all 
legal or natural persons and sets up a system for the coordination of bankruptcy cases, where the 
judgement of one Member State is recognized by the other states.
46 Initially, it was intended to 
deal mainly with business bankruptcies where the insolvent firm and its creditors are located in 
different Member States, in order to ensure that the parties involved have no incentive to 
transfer court proceedings or their assets to a different country to obtain favourable conditions. 
However, as it turns out the regulation has gained in popularity amongst private debtors in 
recent years: since the UK shortened the period of good conduct to 12 months in 2004, non-UK 
consumers have increasingly relocated their residence or ‘centre of main interest’ to the UK in 
order to benefit from the debtor-friendly bankruptcy procedures. In fact, there are companies 
that offer this resettlement service to non-UK residents in the EU, so that debtors can be 
discharged in the UK after 12 months and return to their home country debt free, because the 
                                                      
43 It should be noted that not all central banks record official default rates, only a few have this 
requirement. 
44 The Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009 includes 
measures banning unfair interest rate increases and requiring the use of plain language in credit contracts. 
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings. 
46 Denmark is the only EU Member State not participating in the regulation 1346/2000. 18 | MARIA GERHARDT 
judgement is recognized within the EU. This was evidently not the aim of the regulation when it 
came into force in 2002, two years before the amendment of the UK bankruptcy law. 
Considering the great differences in consumer insolvency approaches and consumer credit 
patterns in the EU, little room is left for common legislation. The basic question that lies at the 
heart of consumer insolvency procedures is whether debtors’ or creditors’ rights should be 
enhanced, and priorities here have been different across Member States. Yet, in the context of 
consumer protection, there is certainly a strong argument to have a guideline or best practice for 
consumer insolvency at EU level. Strenuous efforts have been made to integrate markets for 
retail financial services within the EU. The Consumer Credit Directive includes several 
provisions for common rules in Europe, such as the standardised information sheet, the right of 
withdrawal and early repayment. However, those harmonisation efforts focus on the stages at 
which individuals enter into a credit agreement or are repaying it, no attention has been paid to 
the possibility of standardised consumer protection at the latest stage, where a debtor may find 
himself in default and file for insolvency. The harmonisation effort is therefore not complete, as 
it leaves out the later stages of the whole lifecycle of consumer credits. However, in order to 
address bankruptcy topics, other issues need to be sorted out first, such as a common definition 
of over-indebtedness or non-performing loans.  
One interesting observation on insolvency legislation is the way in which it has been modified 
recently. Whereas the bankruptcy law in the US has been amended to be more restrictive, the 
opposite is the case on this side of the Atlantic. The UK has reduced the period of good conduct 
from 3 years to 12 months; Germany has done so from 7 to 6 years, and France introduced total 
debt discharge in 2004. In the same year, Spain for the first time introduced legislation for 
consumer insolvency in order to support individual debtors. And Italy is still in the process of 
discussing the introduction of individual bankruptcy proceedings. While the trend in the US 
appears to be to restrict lax legislation, European laws are moving towards stronger consumer 
protection, even though the satisfaction of creditors remains the priority in insolvency 
proceedings. Deciding which approach is the right one remains difficult, as it is mostly a 
question of setting priorities: consumer protection against creditors’ rights, or encouraging 
consumer spending against costly restrictive repayment plans.  
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Annex 
Figure A1. Consumer credit as a % of GDP 
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Figure A2. Mortgage credit as % of GDP 
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Source of both figures: ECRI Statistical Package 2009. 
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Table A1. Overview of insolvency laws in selected European countries and the United States 
Country  Legislation  Purpose  Eligibility  Extra-judicial settlement  
USA 
 
Bankruptcy Code  
(11
th Chapter of the United States 
Code) 
Firstly, to give an honest debtor a 
‘fresh start’ in life by relieving the 
debtor of most debts, and secondly, to 
repay creditors in an orderly manner to 
the extent that the debtor has property 
available for payment 
Chapter 7 
Individual, partnership, corporation or 
other business entity, irrespective of 
the amount 
 
Chapter 13 
Any individual as long as unsecured 
debts are less than $336,900 and 
secured debts are less than $1,010,650; 
corporations and partnerships are not 
eligible 
Not compulsory, not common 
France  Code  de  la  consummation  To address the situation of over-
indebtedness of natural persons 
Any well-intentioned debtor who 
cannot meet his personal debts 
Depends on the applied insolvency 
procedure. Renegotiations are 
compulsory with the mostly applied 
procedure 
Germany  Insolvenzordnung  To satisfy creditors’ claims, while 
giving the honest debtor the 
opportunity to have remaining debts 
discharged 
Any debtor who is (or is about to be) 
insolvent 
Yes, compulsory 
Ireland  Bankruptcy Act of 1988  To satisfy creditors' claims by selling 
debtors' assets 
Any debtor who has assets available 
that are sufficient to produce at least 
€1,900. 
Very common, not compulsory 
Spain  Ley 22-2003, de 9 de julio, Concursal  To  satisfy  creditors'  claims  while 
protecting the debtor from the 
consequences of over-indebtedness 
Any debtor who is (or is about to be) 
insolvent 
Not compulsory 
England 
and Wales 
Insolvency Act and Insolvency Rules 
of 1986 
To free the debtor from overwhelming 
debt, while making sure that the assets 
are shared out fairly among the 
creditors 
Any debtor who is insolvent  Not compulsory 
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Table A1. Overview of insolvency laws (cont.) 
Country  Liquidation and foreclosure  Exemption  Good conduct and discharge  Restrictions and punishments 
USA 
 
Chapter 7 
Liquidation and foreclosure 
possible, depends on the exemption 
law of each state 
Chapter 13 
No liquidation foreseen. The debtor 
keeps his property and repays debt 
over time. 
Creditors with secured claims have 
the right to receive at least the value 
of the collateral, and may therefore 
proceed to foreclosure 
Chapter 7 
Exemption law is regulated at the state 
level, but some states allow choosing 
between state and federal exemption 
provisions. Exemption laws vary 
widely and typically provide for a 
share of home and other personal 
property to be exempted 
Chapter 13 
Debtors can typically keep their 
property 
Chapter 7 
No period of good conduct; 
immediate discharge, typically after 4 
months 
Chapter 13 
After the debt settlement plan of 3-5 
years, court may decide to have 
remaining debt discharged.  
Some debts are not discharged, 
including certain long term 
obligations, home mortgages, debts 
for alimony or taxes 
 
France  Liquidation is possible, if imposed 
by judge 
Part of debtor's property and income 
are exempted to provide for enough to 
cover living expense 
Debt settlement plan of max. 10 
years, but typically 5 years. Partial 
and total debt discharge are possible 
Names recorded at the National 
Database on Household Credit 
Repayment Incidents (FICP) 
Germany  Liquidation is possible, if imposed 
by judge 
Part of debtor's property and income 
are exempted to assure a life in dignity 
Period of good conduct of 6 years, 
possibly followed by a debt discharge 
A register at court stores the names of 
insolvent debtors for three years 
Ireland  Yes. All property (including the 
family home) is transferred to a 
trustee, with the exception of 
‘necessaries’ up to a value of 
€3,100. The court may decide to 
appropriate income or pension for 
the benefit of your creditors 
Essentials up to a value of €3,100 or 
more if approved by court 
Legislation does not foresee 
automatic discharge. Discharge is 
possible in several cases when certain 
conditions are met, e.g. debt has been 
repaid, unsecured creditors agree to 
have a discharge or after a period of 
good conduct of 12 years 
Names recorded at the Bankruptcy 
Register. Names include the discharged 
and are not removed from records 
Restrictions concerning managing and 
directing a company. Bankrupts may 
not hold certain public offices 
Spain  Liquidation is possible, but mostly 
for companies. Securitized claims 
may be enforced 
Exemptions  not  explicitly  mentioned  not  applicable  Possible in case the debtor does not 
follow the decisions of the court 
England 
and Wales 
Yes. All assets (including the family 
home) are transferred to a trustee 
Essentials and tools of the trade  Automatic discharge after 12 months  Restrictions concerning obtaining new 
credit, carrying out business or 
managing a company. The bankrupt 
may not hold certain public offices 
Source: Own compilation based on the legislation of the different countries.   
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